Abstract Using a vertically linked model of international trade where producers and sellers are different entities and belong to two different countries, we examine the issue of endogenous leadership. In the absence of policy intervention, there are two cases depending on whether the producer or the seller is the leader. In the presence of policy intervention, the nationality of the leader and that of the follower also becomes important. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for endogenous leadership to arise, and find that in the presence of policy intervention and lump-sum transfers, leadership by the domestic firm -whether it is a producer or a seller -will emerge as the equilibrium.
Introduction
International interfirm collaboration has been growing hand in hand with the overall process of integration of the international economy. Such collaborations have been attracting the attention of scholars from many fields including economics (see, e.g., Backman 1965; Berg and Friedman 1977; Duncan 1982; McConnell and Nantell 1985) . However, bulk of this literature in the field of international business organization concerns themselves primarily with the situation where both domestic and foreign firms have complementary specific inputs and join together to produces a product, sell the product, and share in the resulting profits and losses. However, sellers are commonly distinct from producers in real life. For example, in China, Shanghai General Motors Co., Ltd produce automobiles, sells them to General Motors Warehousing and Trading (Shanghai), a wholly owned GM enterprise which in turn sells automobiles at home and at abroad. In spite of its prevalence in real life, the study of vertical interfirm collaboration is relatively uncommon in the literature of international trade. Nearly 80 years ago, Bowley (1928) studied the implications of vertical relationships and presented the first formal statement of the price leadership problem. Subsequently, others considered a joint-profit-maximization model to solve the problem of indeterminacy of the quantity of intermediate inputs traded (see, e.g., Fellner 1947; Machlup and Taber 1960; Truett and Truett 1993) . Henderson and Quandt (1980) analyzed four possibilities that arise in the determination of equilibrium in a bilateral monopoly model, viz., (1) seller is the leader, the producer takes the price as given, (2) producer is the leader, the seller takes the price as given, (3) collusion by the seller and the buyer, and (4) noncooperation by the seller and buyer in which both of them may go out of business. Other studies that provide game-theoretic solution to the problem include Devadoss and Cooper (2000) where the two entities have equal bargaining power, and Dasgupta and Devadoss (2002) where the two parties have unequal bargaining power. Lahiri and Ono (1999) put the bilateral monopoly structure in the international context and examined the question of optimal tariffs under different market structures.
In the studies discussed above, the issue of leadership, whenever applied, is exogenous in nature; i.e., who is the leader and who is the follower is not determined endogenously inside the model. There is, however, a separate literature in which the issue of leadership is determined endogenously under different contexts. Ono (1978 Ono ( , 1982 , Hamilton and Slutsky (1990 ), and Matsumura (1995 , 2003 examine the issue in a domestic context under different market structures. Das and Lahiri (2006) develop a model of terrorist activity and examine the issue of endogenous leadership between a terrorist organization and a government trying to deal with potential terrorist attacks. Jafarey and Lahiri (2008) consider interactions between a borrowing country and a monopolist lender, and analyze if one and the two parties can emerge as the leader.
In the present chapter, we integrate the two different literatures discussed above. To be more specific, we shall consider a model in which there are a producer and a seller who are engaged in a vertical relationship. We shall examine if the leadership by one of the parties can be agreed upon by both parties, considering their own selfinterests. We provide an international dimension to the problem by assuming that the two parties are nationals of two different countries, called the home and the foreign country. The good is consumed in the home country. We also consider two situations depending on whether the domestic government is passive or it is active in the sense of optimally setting tax/subsidy instruments. In the latter situation, the ownership of the two different parties becomes particularly relevant. In this situation, it also matters as to which of the two is a producer and which one is the seller.
Section 2 considers the case where the domestic government is passive and does not intervene at all. In Sect. 3, we consider the optimal tax/subsidy policy of the domestic government. This section is divided into a number of subsections depending on who is the producer and who is the seller, and in each case who is the leader and who is the follower. Some concluding remarks are made in Sect. 4.
